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  R
esearch with human embryonic 
stem cells (hESCs) has been 
controversial, but in the seven 
years since their isolation by James 
Thomson [1], governments have 
largely answered, at least for now, the 
ﬁ  rst-level questions about this research. 
We now know in most jurisdictions 
whether derivation of hESC lines will 
not be permitted from any embryos or 
whether it will be permitted from all 
embryos, only from embryos created 
as part of in vitro fertilization clinical 
services (IVF), or only from embryos 
  not   created by somatic cell nuclear 
transfer (SCNT). We also have learned 
where the various kinds of cell lines, 
if derived elsewhere, may be used, 
and whether public funding for the 
derivation or use of some or all of the 
lines will be possible. A set of second-
level questions, revolving around the 
donors of cells and embryos used in 
this research, is also rapidly being 
answered. 
    I live in California, which has 
answered all the ﬁ  rst-level questions 
with an enthusiastic endorsement of 
research (Box 1) and which has begun 
to ﬂ  esh out the donor-related issues. 
And yet as my university gears up for 
hESC research, it ﬁ  nds that a host of 
other ethical and legal questions, which 
I will discuss in this Essay, still need to 
be answered. 
    Those questions will not be 
answered in a vacuum—far from 
it. When California researchers 
and their institutions receive funds 
from the California Institute for 
Regenerative Medicine (CIRM), 
created by Proposition 71 [2], they 
will be bound both by some rules set 
in the proposition and by other rules 
that CIRM will impose as regulations. 
Research in California not funded 
by CIRM is governed by standards 
contained in two California statutes 
[3,4], and by regulations that will 
be adopted under those statutes. 
Federal laws and regulations will 
also apply. And although technically 
only recommendations, the report 
of the National Research Council 
and Institute of Medicine panel on 
hESC research (hereafter referred to 
as the National Academy of Science 
[NAS] report) [5] will be watched 
closely, especially if funding agencies 
and journals require adherence to 
them. But these extensive regulations 
and guidelines do not come close to 
answering all existing questions; rather, 
they raise some new ones, individually 
and through their interaction.
    The issues are discussed below in 
the context of California and, more 
broadly, the United States, but, 
wherever in the world this research is 
done (and regulated), most researchers 
across the globe will face most of these 
issues in some form (Figure 1). In 
many parts of the world, continuing 
opposition to this research means that 
it will be done under closer, more 
hostile, public scrutiny than researchers 
have ever experienced. It is important 
for hESC research and for the general 
standing of biomedical research with 
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  Box 1. CIRM
    In November 2004 the voters of 
California passed, with 59% of the 
vote, Proposition 71—an initiative 
that under California’s unusual laws 
was placed on the ballot as a result of 
a petition drive by its supporters. As a 
result, Proposition 71 became part of 
California law without consideration or 
approval by either the legislature or the 
governor. (The legislature had passed 
laws supporting stem cell research in 
2002 and 2003, but without providing 
any funding.) The proposition creates the 
new CIRM, which is governed by a 29-
member “Independent Citizens Oversight 
Committee.” CIRM is authorized to 
borrow US$3 billion using California 
state bonds; this money is to be spent 
in California over ten years to support 
research on human stem cells, with an 
emphasis on types of research not fully 
supported by the US federal government 
(i.e., hESCs). The proposition has been 
challenged in court as violating California 
and federal law, and, as a result, no bonds 
have yet been sold, so no money has 
been disbursed. CIRM hopes to resolve 
the lawsuits soon and to begin funding 
research sometime in 2006. Several other 
American states have passed legislation 
supporting stem cell research, but their 
mechanisms are not as ﬂ  eshed out as 
CIRM’s. 
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the public that researchers throughout 
the world answer these questions wisely. 
    The shocking fraud committed by 
Woo Suk Hwang and some of his group 
does not raise any new ethical issues—
outright fabrication of results is now, 
and always has been, unethical. Yet 
Hwang’s misdeeds make it even more 
important that hESC researchers both 
be fully ethical and be perceived as fully 
ethical in order to rebuild trust in this 
controversial area. 
    Ethical Issues Related to Donors
    All newly derived hESC lines will 
require embryos, eggs and sperm 
with which to make embryos, or eggs 
and somatic cells with which to make 
SCNT embryos. The most numerous 
ethical issues that must be resolved 
involve how the people who donate 
those embryos, gametes, or somatic 
cells should be treated. These donor-
related issues have begun to receive 
substantial attention through laws and 
guidelines [3–5] and from academic 
commentators [7–10]. Chapter Five 
of the NAS report and its associated 
guidelines lay out what seems to be 
a consensus position about such 
donors (Box 2). Although there may 
be disagreement with some details of 
the NAS guidelines, they seem likely 
to be widely adopted. At least two 
issues relating to the donors, however, 
require further consideration: different 
kinds of donors and donor privacy. 
    Not all donors are ethically the 
same. Donors for hESC purposes 
may be (1) couples donating frozen 
embryos created for reproductive 
purposes, (2) couples donating “fresh” 
embryos created for reproductive 
purposes, (3) women donating fresh 
eggs harvested for reproductive 
purposes, (4) women donating fresh 
eggs harvested for research, (5) 
people donating somatic cells for use 
as nuclear donor cells for research, 
and (6) men donating sperm. The 
discussion of donors, including in the 
NAS report, has largely focused on 
the ﬁ  rst category—people who might 
donate some of the several hundred 
thousand embryos that sit in American 
freezers. The people who had those 
embryos created (often, but not 
always, the same people who provided 
the eggs and sperm for their creation) 
will be well removed from the clinical 
processes of gamete donation and 
embryo creation, and will know more 
about the success of their reproductive 
efforts. Donors in the second, third, 
or fourth category—couples donating 
fresh embryos and women donating 
eggs—may raise some slightly different 
issues. On the other hand, because of 
the ease of the processes, donation of 
sperm and of somatic cells does not 
seem to raise any special problems. 
    Increasingly, researchers suspect that 
fresh embryos, not previously frozen, 
are more likely to lead to successful cell 
lines. The potential donors of these 
embryos will still be in the middle of 
their reproductive efforts and will have 
both less emotional distance from the 
decision and less knowledge of whether 
they might eventually want to use that 
embryo for themselves. For SCNT, 
donation of eggs will be required; egg 
freezing is only now emerging, in a few 
centers, into clinical practice. There 
are no freezers ﬁ  lled with frozen eggs 
that might be donated; donated eggs 
will come from women who have just 
undergone the egg donation process, 
a process that is at best uncomfortable 
and at worst life threatening—estimates 
are that more than 1% of women 
undergoing egg harvesting require 
hospitalization for complications. A 
woman who has just gone through 
the often difﬁ  cult process of egg 
harvesting for reproductive uses will 
be asked to choose between possibly 
making use of potentially good eggs 
herself or donating them. The now-
retracted 2005   Science   paper by Hwang 
and his team [11] falsely claimed 
much greater success with eggs from 
younger women, who are less likely 
to have a clinical need for in vitro 
fertilization, thus raising the prospect 
that other researchers would also use 
eggs from “research donors” who are 
not undergoing egg harvesting for any 
clinical reproductive purpose. This 
approach may well survive Hwang’s 
disgrace. 
    The differences between kinds 
of donors raise at least two issues. 
First, the differences between 
donating frozen embryos, on the 
one hand, and donating embryos 
and eggs newly created or harvested 
for reproductive purposes, on the 
other, may require some variation in 
the consent process. In the second 
case, the consent process and the 
patient’s decisions will be intimately, 
and imminently, connected with the 
patient’s reproductive decisions and 
will take place under intense time 
pressure. It will be important for the 
patient to know how many eggs or 
embryos, of what apparent quality, have 
been obtained, and to understand the 
clinical implications of donating eggs 
or embryos. Such a consent process 
will be harder, and will require more 
preparation, than consent to the 
donation of frozen embryos. 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030143.g001 
 Figure  1.  Stem Cell Policy Map
      Countries colored in brown have a permissive or ﬂ  exible policy on human embryonic stem cell 
research. All have banned human reproductive cloning. These countries represent about 3.4 billion 
people, more than half the world’s population. “Permissive” (countries in dark brown) means 
that various embryonic stem cell derivation techniques are permitted, including SCNT. “Flexible” 
(countries in light brown) means that stem cells may be derived from human embryos donated 
by fertility clinics only, excluding SCNT. Countries in yellow have either a restrictive policy or no 
established policy.
    (Image: William Hoffman, MBBNet [6])  
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    Second, for women undergoing egg 
harvest solely for research purposes, it 
is not clear that such donations should 
always be accepted. As Mildred Cho 
and David Magnus point out, these 
women would be undergoing the 
nontrivial risks of egg harvesting for no 
clinical beneﬁ  t of their own, and would 
be more akin to living solid organ 
donors, whose requests to donate are 
often declined, than to frozen embryo 
donors [7]. Researchers and their 
institutions need to ensure, through 
their institutional review boards, 
embryonic stem cell research oversight 
(ESCRO) committees, or other 
regulatory bodies, that such donors are 
used only when appropriate. 
    The issue of privacy also needs more 
attention because of the long life span, 
and many possible uses, of hESC lines. 
As Bernard Lo points out, if those 
lines are ever to be used clinically, it 
not only will probably be impossible 
to promise donors anonymity, but it 
also may be necessary to warn them of 
continuing medical surveillance. [8] 
It seems highly likely that the US Food 
and Drug Administration will want as 
much information as possible about the 
donors’ health, not only with regard to 
pathogens that may infect the donated 
cells, but also about diseases with 
genetic or family links. This kind of 
periodic recontact is itself an intrusion 
on donors; the fact that their identities 
and their whereabouts will have to be 
maintained by the investigators makes 
protection of their conﬁ  dentiality more 
difﬁ  cult. Both consequences will have 
to be discussed with potential donors. 
  Creating  Embryos
    The creation of embryos for 
research purposes is allowed in some 
jurisdictions and banned in others. 
Even where such creation is permitted, 
another question may need to be 
answered: can nonhuman oocytes be 
used to create embryos through SCNT 
that could give rise to hESC lines? The 
supply of human oocytes may well 
turn out to be the rate-limiting factor 
for production of hESC lines. As early 
as 1998, Advanced Cell Technologies 
experimented with a possible way 
around this constraint by trying to use 
enucleated cow eggs as a host for a 
donated human nucleus [12]; in 2003, 
a group in Shanghai claimed to have 
made hESC lines using rabbit eggs. 
More recently, Ian Wilmut and other 
British scientists are seeking permission 
from British authorities to use rabbit 
eggs to create embryonic stem cells to 
study human disease. [13] If successful, 
this could substitute easily available 
oocytes from other mammals for hard-
to-obtain human oocytes. Senator Sam 
Brownback has introduced legislation 
in the US Congress that would make 
the transfer of a human nucleus 
into a nonhuman oocyte a criminal 
offense [14], and such a provision has 
formed part of a privately announced 
“conservative bioethics agenda” for the 
second Bush Administration [15,16].
  Deriving  Cell  Lines
    The big questions about deriving 
cell lines are being answered by 
governments, but at least one other 
derivation question may need to 
be answered: how “old” an embryo 
may be used to make cell lines? Most 
commentators have followed the 1990 
British statute by setting a deadline of 
the appearance of the primitive streak 
or roughly 12–14 days of development, 
the time when the primitive streak 
can ﬁ  rst be seen [17]. The NAS report 
speciﬁ  cally bans any “researching 
involving in vitro culture of any 
intact human embryo, regardless of 
derivation methods, for longer than 14 
days or until formation of the primitive 
streak begins, whichever occurs ﬁ  rst” 
[5]. It may turn out that cells can be 
more successfully differentiated in situ 
in a developing embryo than in lab 
equipment [18]. The justiﬁ  cations for 
using the primitive streak as a limit 
are more arguments of strong caution 
than scientiﬁ  cally justiﬁ  ed lines—for 
example, an embryo could not have 
any sensation or consciousness before 
any neural cells differentiate, which 
does not occur until well after the 
appearance of the primitive streak. 
Sensation, let alone consciousness, is 
probably impossible for months after 
the formation of the primitive streak. 
Quick adoption of a primitive streak 
deadline may end up incurring major 
scientiﬁ  c costs for no ethical beneﬁ  t; on 
the other hand, using another dividing 
line requires ﬁ  nding or justifying a 
bright line in what may be a smooth 
development process. And abandoning 
the primitive streak line at this point 
opens researchers to the claim that 
they will never hold to any ethical lines 
when it is convenient to move them. 
  Using  hESCs
    One can imagine commercial uses 
for hESCs that people would ﬁ  nd 
inappropriate, such as uses in cosmetics 
or as animal feed. At this stage in hESC 
research, those kinds of uses are not 
plausible, but one research use of hESCs 
has prompted substantial discussion 
and controversy—their use in making 
human/nonhuman chimeras [19–22]. 
Such chimeras may be useful in studying 
human cells and tissues in vivo in a 
laboratory animal, similar to the way that 
the SCID-hu mouse provides a model 
for the human immune system in an 
organism that can be experimented on 
much more freely than can humans. 
    The NAS panel recommended a 
ﬂ  at ban on the creation of chimeras 
by inserting hESCs into the blastocysts 
of nonhuman primates and, out of 
fear that hESCs may have led to the 
production of human gametes, on the 
breeding of any nonhuman animals 
into which hESCs had been introduced. 
  Box 2. Ethical Issues 
Surrounding Donors: Guidance 
from the NAS Report
    •  All embryo, gamete, and cell donors 
must consent to the use of the 
donated material for hESC research 
at the time of the donation, not in 
advance of the donation. 
    •  No payments, in cash or in kind, may 
be paid to the donors (including 
reimbursement or waiving of fees 
for storing frozen embryos), except 
that women who donate oocytes 
solely for research purposes may be 
reimbursed for the direct expenses of 
the procedure. 
    •  Donors’ decisions about their infertility 
treatments should be insulated 
from research concerns, in part by 
separating, whenever possible, the 
roles of the treating physician and the 
hESC researcher. 
    •  A long list of issues must be discussed 
as part of the informed consent, and 
donors must be given the option of 
limiting the kinds of research that may 
be done with their embryos or cells, 
allowing, for example, derivation of 
hESC lines but not allowing SCNT. 
    •  Perhaps most importantly, the NAS 
report requires institutions to set up 
ESCRO committees to oversee all 
aspects of this work.  
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More broadly, it required that ESCRO 
committees speciﬁ  cally review any 
research that would introduce hESCs 
into nonhuman animals, and it advised 
particular caution in approving 
experiments putting hESCs into 
the brains of nonhuman animals. 
The Canadian Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, adopted in 2004, 
banned the creation of chimeras 
deﬁ  ned as either the insertion of a 
nonhuman cell into a human embryo 
or an embryo with cells from more than 
one human embryo, fetus, or human 
being [23]. Senator Brownback’s 
proposed legislation would ban 
several more types of chimera [14]. 
Researchers and institutions will 
have to decide whether to follow 
the Brownback position or the less 
restrictive NAS recommendations and, 
either way, under what circumstances 
ESCROs should allow the creation 
of permissible human/nonhuman 
chimeras.
    Property and Cell Lines
    Researchers and their institutions will 
also have to deal with complicated 
legal, ethical, and political questions 
concerning property and stem 
cells, both intellectual property and 
“personal” property. The intellectual 
property issues for research institutions 
and research funders like CIRM mainly 
concern whether to claim, and how 
to assert, rights in stem cell–related 
discoveries; those funders need 
not follow the model of the federal 
government and its Bayh–Dole Act. 
The article by Merrill Goozner in   PLoS 
Medicine   describes many of the issues 
raised, including those of inexpensive 
access to treatments [24]. Institutions 
will have to decide whether to seek 
patents and on what terms to license 
them for research or other uses. This 
issue is especially complicated for 
CIRM, as the language of Proposition 
71 carefully skirted this issue [2].
    An equally important patent issue 
has received less attention. All those 
interested in hESC research will also 
have to decide how to deal with existing 
patents in the area. The Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation, a 
nonproﬁ  t institution associated with 
the University of Wisconsin, owns two 
apparently fundamental US patents on 
hESCs granted to Thomson. Research 
institutions will have to make decisions 
about how to respond to these and 
other relevant patents by reaching an 
agreement with the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation to license them, 
by trying to “invent around” them [25], 
or possibly by litigating their validity. 
    Intellectual property has gotten most 
of the attention around stem cells, 
but the property in the physical cells 
themselves also raises issues. One of 
the usual consequences of ownership, 
the power to sell, may not apply to 
hESC lines. California law bans the 
purchase or sale of “donated cells” or 
of embryonic tissue, although it does 
allow reasonable payment for certain 
expenses [2,4]; the NAS guidelines 
contain similar recommendations. 
When obtaining gametes and other 
cells for hESC research, providing 
hESCs to others, and obtaining them 
for their own research, institutions will 
have to make sure that the payments 
involved are only for the kinds of 
reimbursement that fall within the 
statutory exceptions. 
  “Border”  Issues
    The last set of issues that must be 
confronted is the most bureaucratic, 
the least “ethical,” and the most 
maddening—but not the least 
important. Researchers and their 
institutions will have to deal with many 
“border” issues, questions about the 
edges of various legal, ethical, and 
regulatory schemes. These include 
questions of time, of location, of 
funding, of collaboration, and of 
technologies.
    Various hESC lines have been, and 
will be, created at different times. 
Can a researcher use a cell line that 
was appropriately created at the time 
of its creation but that would not 
qualify for use if it were created now? 
This is not a hypothetical question. 
The NAS guidelines, for example, 
require that all cell lines be derived 
only after permission from an ESCRO 
committee, but until the NAS invented 
them, ESCRO committees did not 
exist. Therefore, no cell lines derived 
before the NAS report, including the 
pre-August 2001 lines that the US 
government will fund, can meet that 
NAS recommendation. Can those cell 
lines be used? 
    Cell lines are also created in different 
places with different regulatory 
schemes. Can a cell line created 
legally in one country be used in 
another country with slightly different 
requirements? CIRM’s proposed 
interim guidelines addressed this issue 
speciﬁ  cally for the United Kingdom, 
allowing the use of CIRM funds to 
do research on cell lines approved by 
the British Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Authority, but what about 
cell lines from South Korea, Singapore, 
Sweden, Israel, or Australia? And can 
researchers in those countries use US 
stem cell lines? 
    Funding restrictions create messier 
border issues. This is primarily 
a problem in the US for federal 
funds—which may not be spent to 
support research with hESC lines, 
except with those “registered lines” 
that comply with President Bush’s 
policy [26]. It could also arise with 
other funding sources, in California 
and elsewhere, that limit what kinds of 
research can be done with their funds. 
Such funding limitations may sound 
straightforward, but they are not. What 
does it mean to   use   federal funds? Can 
an institution use a microscope owned 
by the federal government? What 
about a microscope purchased with 
federal funds but now owned by the 
institution? If a researcher’s computer 
was purchased with federal funds, 
can it be used to prepare a talk about 
results with unregistered cell lines? If a 
university’s E-mail system is supported 
in part by federal funds, can it be used 
for messages involving nonregistered 
lines? The early guidance from the 
federal government has been that 
nonconforming use of things covered 
by indirect-cost pools could be 
permitted, but they would have to be 
proportionately excluded from federal 
reimbursement. Does that mean that a 
university, or an individual researcher, 
has to track and then subtract the 
percentage of E-mail usage, telephone 
usage, electricity usage, and anything 
else that goes into the overhead-
cost pool and involves work with 
unregistered cell lines? 
    Complying with this kind of funding 
restriction presents another problem. 
The US National Institutes of Health 
states clearly: “No federal funds may 
be used, directly or indirectly, to 
support research on [nonregistered] 
human embryonic stem cell lines…” 
[27]. What does it mean to use 
federal funds “directly or indirectly, 
to support research on” hESC lines? 
Would research with factors derived 
from a nonapproved cell line be able 
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to use federal funds? Would research 
into genes found to be expressed in 
such unregistered lines be allowed or 
would that “support” unapproved hESC 
research? Can a bioethicist get federal 
funding to write an article about ethical 
problems involved in using hESC lines, 
or can that article be written only if it 
only discusses registered lines or only if 
it attacks (does not “support”) research 
with unregistered lines? All these 
questions depend on the deﬁ  nition of 
“research   on   human embryonic stem 
cell lines.”
    Another important border issue 
involves collaborations. Assume a 
researcher at a California university 
wants to collaborate with an overseas 
research group. Can the researcher 
participate in that research only if the 
research meets all the requirements 
of US federal law, California law, the 
NAS guidelines, and any regulations 
that the university has imposed? Stem 
cell research is an international affair, 
and it would be foolish to expect 
each country to adopt exactly the 
same regulatory scheme. Generally, 
American university faculty cannot 
do human subjects research overseas 
without getting approval from their 
home institutional review board. Will 
such faculty have to get their home 
institution’s ESCRO to approve—if 
possible—research in Singapore, 
Cambridge, or Seoul in which they 
want to collaborate? And if so, how do 
we deﬁ  ne “collaborate”?
    The ﬁ  nal border issue may turn out 
to be the most important. The current 
statutes, regulations, and guidelines 
apply to speciﬁ  c “things”: embryos, 
embryonic stem cells, embryonic stem 
cell lines, etc. Each of these has its own 
deﬁ  nition, explicit or implicit. But as 
technology changes, hESC research 
may move in directions that do not 
fall within the existing deﬁ  nitions. 
Legislators have been wrong before; 
the British reproductive technologies 
statute banned human cloning in 1990, 
but the method it banned was not the 
one used in 1996 to clone Dolly [28]. 
If reprogrammed somatic cells were 
to make something that looked like a 
blastocyst, would that be an embryo 
giving rise to hESC lines for some, 
none, or all of the laws, regulations, 
and guidelines governing such 
research? 
  Conclusion
    These are not all the remaining ethical 
issues; the discussion is constrained by 
limits of both space and imagination. 
Most of the issues discussed above are 
not unique to hESC research, and 
many may seem petty, issues of detail 
only. But with a subject as controversial 
as hESC research, no detail can be 
considered petty. Researchers and 
their institutions must assume that not 
just their work but how they do their 
work will often be examined under a 
microscope, by hostile observers. As 
a result, the legal and ethical issues 
associated with hESC research will 
impose great and often unprecedented 
burdens on the researchers, 
administrators, and even lawyers for any 
institution that embarks on it. Coping 
with these issues will be painful, but not 
handling them well will be worse for 
individual researchers and institutions 
and for science as a whole.   
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